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CASE NOTES
TAXATION-EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON INCOME
TAX DEDUCTIONS
The petitioners were engaged in the optical business in North Caro-
lina and Virginia in 1943 and 1944. Pursuant to agreements reflecting an
established and widespread practice in that industry in those localities,
they paid to the doctors who prescribed the eyeglasses which they sold,
one-third of the retail sales price received for the glasses. These payments
were deducted by petitioners as business expenses in their income tax
returns, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue subsequently dis-
allowed the deduction on the grounds that the payments were made
under contracts which were void and unenforceable as against public
policy and consequently not deductible as ordinary and necessary ex-
penses. The Tax Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld the action of the Commissioner,' but were re-
versed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90 (1952).
The court here was confronted with the problem of what limitation
Congress intended to impose with respect to the types of business ex-
penses which may be deducted under the very general language of Sec-
tion 23 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.2 Although there is no state-
ment in the Code or in its accompanying regulations prohibiting the
deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses on the ground
that they violate or frustrate "public policy,"3 the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the Tax Court and the federal courts have from time to time
narrowed the generally accepted meaning of the language in Section
23 (a) "in order that tax deduction consequences might not frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of
conduct."'
In previous tax cases involving the question of public policy, the courts
11,illy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 188 F. 2d 269 (C.A. 4th, 1951), aff'g
14 T.C. 1066 (1950).
2 "SEC. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME.
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"(a) Expenses.-
"(1) Trade or Business Expenses.-
"(A) In General.-All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.. " nt. Rev. Code
§ 23 (a) (1) (A), 26 U.S.C.A. S 23 (a) (1) (A) (1948).
3Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 94 (1952).
4Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943).
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have been called upon to rule on the deductibility of a wide variety of
alleged "business" expenses, ranging from expenditures for lobbying pur-
poses to fines and penalties paid for law violations.5 The Lilly case differs
from the majority of public policy cases in that it involved no violation
of a statute or governmental regulation, but only the violation of ethical
standards established by organized professional societies.6
In arriving at its decision that the so-called "kickbacks" made to ocu-
lists in the Lilly case were proper business deductions, the Supreme Court
first found that they were "ordinary and necessary" business expenses,
and secondly, that they did not frustrate any sharply defined national or
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.7
The question of what meaning is to be given to the term "ordinary
and necessary" has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in earlier deci-
sions. In Welch v. Helvering8 the court held that to be ordinary, an
expense need not be habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer
will have to incur it often. An expense may occur only once in the life-
time of a particular taxpayer, but it is ordinary if it is common and
accepted in the business world.9 This same meaning was given to the
term "ordinary" in Commissioner v. Heininger,0 and in addition, an ex-
pense was said to be "necessary" if it is appropriate and helpful to the
business.
In the instant case, the kickback payment were held to be "ordinary"
in the generally accepted meaning of that word, in that during the years
in question they were normal, usual, customary in size and character,
and made under a long-established practice in the optical industry in
that locality.11
The payments also were held to be necessary in that it was through
making such payments that the petitioners had been able to establish their
business. 12 In the view of the court, discontinuance of the payments by
the petitioners would have meant either that the doctors would in the
future refer their patients to competing opticians who continued to make
the kickbacks, or that the doctors would go back to their prior practice
5 For compilations and analyses of public policy cases, consult Schwartz, Business
Expenses Contrary to Public Policy, 8 Tax L. Rev. 241 (1953); Eulenberg, Influence
of Public Policy on Deductions, 28 Taxes 1189 (1950); Arent, Inequities in Non-
Deductibility of Fines, Penalties, Defense Expense, 87 J. of Acetcy. 482 (1949);
Deduction of Business Expenses, Illegality and Public Policy, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
582 (1941).
OLilly v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1066, 1080 (1950).
7 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93, 97 (1952).
8290 U.S. 111 (1933). 9Ibid., at 114.
10 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943).
11 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1952).
12 Ibid.
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of themselves fitting and selling the glasses. 18 Therefore, continuance of
these payments was deemed by the court to be as essential to petitioners
as were their other business expenses.
Without questioning the over-all logic and soundness of the decision,
one may question the validity of the argument that refusal of the petition-
ers to continue the payments would have resulted in the doctors referring
future patients to* competing opticians who continued to make the pay-
ments. Such argument would appear to be based on the premise that the
competing opticians would have the benefit of a tax deduction for such
payments, where as they would not enjoy that benefit if such payments
were held to be non-deductible under the law. It is inconceivable that
any of the opticians would long have continued to "kickback" one-third
of the sales price of the glasses if such payments were not allowed as a
deduction in computing the taxable income of the business.
The real importance of the Lilly case lies in the Court's pronounce-
ments with respect to the question of public policy. The groundwork
for this decision was laid in the Heininger case. There a licensed dentist
who sold false teeth through fraudulent mail advertising was permitted
to deduct legal expenses incurred in unsuccessfully resisting the issuance
by the Postmaster General of a fraud order. The decision hinged on
the question of whether or not allowance of the deduction would frus-
trate the sharply defined policies of the statute under which the Post-
master General was authorized to issue fraud orders.14 After determining
that the policy of the statute was to protect the public from fraudulent
practices committed through the use of the mails and not to impose per-
sonal punishment on violators, the Court held that to deny the deduction
for legal expenses in presenting a bona fide defense would attach a serious
punitive consequence to the Postmaster General's findings which Con-
gress had not expressly or impliedly indicated should result from such
a finding.'5
Many courts throughout the country have considered the question of
what "public policy" is and have expressed widely varying views as to
the answer.' 6 In an earlier case not involving income tax, the Supreme
Court said that the public policy of a state or nation must be determined
by its constitution, laws, and the judicial decisions of its highest courts,
not by the varying opinion of laymen, lawyers, or judges as to the de-
mands or interests of the public.' 7 The Court's application of this defini-
13 Ibid.
14 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943).
25 Ibid.
16Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed. 1940), vol. 35, pp. 274-291, contains hundreds
of excerpts from court decisions defining the term "public policy."
17 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Chicago I.C. Railway, 175 U.S. 91, 100 (1899).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tion to the facts in the instant case may be seen in its rejection of the
Commissioner's argument that customs and actions of organized profes-
sional groups, such as medical associations, may constitute the "sharply
defined National or State policies" the frustration of which may, as a
matter of law, preclude the deductibility of an expense under Section
23 (a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code.'8
What the high court apparently was condemning was any attempt
by a governmental bureau or by lower courts to determine public policy
in situations where there is no applicable statute or official governmental
declaration proscribing particular types of conduct. In this connection
it is of interest to note that both the Tax Court and the Circuit Court
adopted a highly moral tone in their respective opinions in the Lilly case,
censuring the doctors who accepted the "kickbacks" for violating the
fiduciary relationship of patient and physician, and the opticians for
offering the bait of the secret consideration which led to what was
termed a "corrupt practice."'19 The Circuit Court cited particular ethical
standards of the medical profession which were violated by the prac-
tice.20
Judge Arundell of the Tax Court wrote a strongly dissenting opinion,
based on much the same practical line of reasoning used by the Supreme
Court in arriving at its decision. 21
The decision of the Supreme Court appears to be one of practicality.
While voicing no approval of the business ethics involved in the pay-
ments,22 it gave recognition to the practical aspects of taxation and the
problems which businesses face in this competitive commercial era. The
decision is not subject to the criticism sometimes made, that courts fail
to give consideration to the actualities with which tax laws are supposed
to deal.23
The court took note of the fact that legislation has been passed in re-
18 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
19 Lilly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 188 F. 2d 269, 271 (C.A. 4th, 1951).
20 Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association, Chapter
III, Art. I, Sec. 5 (1943):
"It is unprofessional to accept rebates on prescriptions or appliances, or perquisites
from attendants who aid in the care of patients."
And in Chapter III, Art. VI, Sec. 4:
"When a patient is referred by one physician to another for consultation or for
treatment, whether the physician in charge accompanies the patient or not, it is
unethical to give or to receive a commission by whatever term it may be called
or under any guise or pretext whatsoever."
21 Lilly v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1066, 1087 (1950).
22 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
23Kelley-Dempsey & Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 35 (1934), criticized in 35
Col. L. Rev. 125 (1935); 4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sec. 25. 102
(1942 Ed.).
CASE NOTES
cent years in North Carolina and other States outlawing the practice of
optical kickbacks, 24 but this did not affect its decision, since it was con-
cerned with public policy as it existed in 1943 and 1944, when the kick-
backs were made.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in the Lilly case, the Tax Court
has had occasion to pass upon the deductibility of secret payments in the
nature of bribes or graft made by one company to the purchasing agent
of another company in order to procure a contract. 25 In deciding that the
payments were not deductible, the court avoided the question of public
policy and made a factual finding that the payments were not to be re-
garded as normal, usual, nor customary in the business world, or "such as
were allowable in Lilly v. Commissioner."26
The Tax Court apparently was on safe ground in this instance, since the
Supreme Court has previously said that the question of whether an ex-
pense is directly related to a business and whether it is ordinary and nec-
essary are doubtless pure questions of fact in most instances, and that a
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 27 on these issues should not be re-
versed by the federal appellate courts, except where a question of law
is unmistakably involved.28
On the related question of fee-splitting by surgeons, which the Com-
missioner had been inclined to treat in the same manner as the kickbacks
in the Lilly case, a new position was assumed which gave recognition to
the policy enunciated by the Supreme Court. This new position was set
forth in a Bureau ruling29 to the effect that payments by surgeons under
split-fee arrangements would be deductible where they complied sub-
stantially with the tests laid down in the Lilly case.
TORTS-WIFE ENTITLED TO SUE SPOUSE
FOR PERSONAL INJURY
The plaintiff alleged that while she was riding as a guest in the car of
the defendant, her husband, he wilfully and wantonly collided with an-
other car, causing injuries to her. The parties were subsequently divorced.
The wife brought this tort action which was dismissed in the Superior
Court. The Appellate Court affirmed that decision.' The Illinois Supreme
24N.C. Laws (1951) c. 1089, §§ 21, 23; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§ 10185-14; Deering's Cal. Business and Professions Code (1951) SS 650, 652.
25 Estate of Lashells, 11 T.C.M. 274 (1952), 52, 086 P-H MEMO T.C. (1952).
26Estate of Lashells, 11 T.C.M. 274 (1952), 52, 086 P-H MEMO T.C. (1952).
27The Board of Tax Appeals was redesignated the Tax Court of the United
States by Act October 21, 1942, ch. 619, title V., S 504, 56 Stat. 957.
'.8 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943).
29 I.T. 4096, 1952 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 18, at 3 (1952).
1 Brandt v. Keller, 347 111. App. 18, 105 N.E. 2d 796 (1952).
